





















What determines debt intolerance? The role of 
political and monetary institutions
by Raffaela Giordano and Pietro TommasinoThe purpose of the Temi di discussione series is to promote the circulation of working 
papers prepared within the Bank of Italy or presented in Bank seminars by outside 
economists with the aim of stimulating comments and suggestions.
The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the 
responsibility of the Bank.
Editorial Board:  Patrizio Pagano, Alfonso Rosolia, Ugo Albertazzi, Claudia Biancotti, 
Giulio  Nicoletti,  Paolo  Pinotti,  Enrico  Sette,  Marco  Taboga,  Pietro  Tommasino, 
Fabrizio Venditti.
Editorial Assistants:  Roberto Marano, Nicoletta Olivanti.WHAT DETERMINES DEBT INTOLERANCE? THE ROLE OF POLITICAL AND 
MONETARY INSTITUTIONS 
 




Why do some states default on their debt more often than others? We argue that 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations. 1 Introduction1
Reinhart et al. (2003, 2008) show that some countries are sistematically more likely to default
than others. Moreover, most of these default episodes happened at relatively low levels of debt. On
the contrary, other countries and governments are able to sustain much higher borrowing levels,
without precipitating a crisis. In this paper we provide an explanation for this stylized fact, arguing
that some sovereign borrowers are more prone to default than others due to the features of their
political and monetary institutions.
Faced with a large amount of public debt obligations, governments either re-absorb them
through ￿scal consolidation (by cutting expenditure and/or increasing taxes), or cancel them out
with a sovereign default. This choice is particularly compelling for countries in which in￿ ating the
debt away is not a viable option, either because it is short-term or because it is denominated in a
foreign currency.
Di⁄erent strategies to cope with a high-debt situation entail very di⁄erent macroeconomic re-
sults, as well as very di⁄erent redistributive consequences. We propose a model in which the
government takes into account these redistributive e⁄ects when deciding whether to ful￿ll or de-
fault on its promises. It will default if and only if the implied costs for its constituency are lower
than the bene￿ts.
Typically, both the very poor and the very rich hold a relatively low share of their wealth in
government bonds. Indeed, the former are often excluded from ￿nancial markets and hold most
of their wealth in the form of cash, while the latter hold a relatively high share of their wealth
in more sophisticated high-return, risky ￿nancial instruments. Therefore, our ￿rst point is that a
large and politically in￿ uent middle class should improve debt sustainability.
However, if the default puts the ￿nancial system in jeopardy (e.g. if it triggers a bank run or
a wave of panic selling) it can harm the rich, too. In such circumstances, a pro-rich ("elitist")
government will pressure the central bank to inject an excessive amount of liquidity in the ￿nancial
system, to sustain ￿nancial markets and shield the rich from the consequences of the default, even
1The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re￿ ect the position of the Bank
of Italy. We thank for helpful comments Francesco Lippi, Giuseppe Cappelletti, Sandro Momigliano, two anonymous
referees, seminar participants at the 63rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, the 22nd Congress
of the European Economic Association and the XVI edition of the International Tor Vergata Conference on Banking
and Finance. The usual disclaimers apply.
5if this policy results in a rise in in￿ ation (indeed, in￿ ation will mostly harm the poor as the rich
invest more of their wealth in shares and other real assets).
Symmetrically, the poor will stand to lose from the bail out of the ￿nancial system because
they are very much exposed to its in￿ ationary consequences. A pro-poor ("populist") government
will pressure the central bank not to inject liquidity in the ￿nancial system, even in circumstances
in which this policy would be welfare-enhancing. Again, it takes a su¢ ciently independent central
bank to resist these pressures.
Therefore, our second point is that an independent central bank increases debt sustainability,
because it ensures that both the rich and the poor will bear at least part of the costs of the default,
so that even a government which is not responsive to the middle class has an incentive to honour
its debt.
To sum up, countries without the proper political and monetary institutions cannot sustain debt
levels that are instead sustainable for others. According to the de￿nition introduced by Reinhart
et al. (2003), they su⁄er from "debt intolerance". In particular, we show that there is a country-
speci￿c debt threshold above which default occurs, and that this threshold gets higher as the middle
class increases its political power and central banks gain greater independence.
We build on the seminal contribution by Calvo (1988). In his paper, and in ours as well,
the policy-maker equates the marginal costs of servicing the public debt with the marginal costs
associated with debt repudiation.
Calvo assumes that the government is benevolent and that agents are homogeneous. Both
hypotheses are relaxed in Beetsma (1996). In his model agents di⁄er in their holdings of public
debt, and the government does not necessarily maximize social welfare. Beetsma argues that in
this framework the policy-maker will be more tempted to default if its constituency holds relatively
few government bonds.2 While we take this insight as our starting point, with respect to Beetsma
(1996) our paper represents a step forward in various respects.
First, we relate agents￿portfolios to deeper characteristics of the economy (namely, ￿nancial
market imperfections and the wealth of the di⁄erent classes of agents).
Second, while in Beetsma there is a single policy-maker, we introduce the central bank into the
picture. Indeed, several authors (e.g. Alesina, 1988) show that the behavior of monetary authorities
is crucial in determining the outcome of the debt end-game.3
2See also Beetsma and van der Ploeg (1996).
3Of course, in the messy social and political context of a debt crisis, the pressures of the government on the
6Third, we endogenize the costs associated with a sovereign default. In the literature, default
costs have been traced back to the exclusion of the defaulting sovereign from the debt market
(Eaton and Gersovits, 1981), and to broader reputational concerns (Cole and Kehoe, 1998).4 To
our knowledge, we are the ￿rst to formally model the idea that ￿nancial markets disruption and/or
high in￿ ation might be part of the costs of a sovereign default. In the real world defaults do tend
to be associated with such unpleasant consequences (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999, and the
survey by De Paoli et al., 2006).
Our paper also relates to the vast literature that highlights the costs of economic inequality and
political polarization (see e.g. Glaeser et al., 2003).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 spells out the model, sections 3 and 4 describe its
equilibria, section 5 concludes.
2 A model of the debt end-game
In our model economy there are: (i) two periods; (ii) four (types of) agents: a measure-one
continuum of risk-neutral consumers/investors, a representative commercial bank, the government
and the central bank (CB); (iii) four kinds of ￿nancial instruments: cash, in￿ ation-indexed govern-
ment bonds,5 bank deposits and bank loans. The intertemporal discount factor is set equal to 1
throughout.
We introduce elements of ￿nancial market imperfection into the model by assuming that ￿nan-
cial market participation is incomplete. We model this assumption in the most parsimonius way,
by introducing minimum size requirements to buy certain kinds of assets.
The timing of the game is the following (see ￿gure 1). In period 1 the goverment issues debt;
individuals allocate their wealth between cash, government bonds and bank deposits; the bank
invests a portion of its assets in government bonds and the rest in high-return, risky, illiquid loans;
the market-clearing return on goverment bonds is determined. At the beginning of period 2, the
national central bank are typically very strong. However, central bank independence is more a matter of degree than
a 0/1 feature (Franzese, 1999). Besides, while the government can exert pressures on the central bank, there are
typically other groups in society which stand ready to defend its independence.
4Surveys of this literature can be found in Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2006).
5The assumption that government bonds are in￿ ation-indexed makes the analysis much simpler without a⁄ecting
the main results, at least qualitatively. Our set-up is equivalent to one in which the government issues foreign
currency-denominated bonds, and the CB controls the exchange rate. This institutional set-up is particularly suitable
for studying the problems of developing countries, in which a large portion of public debt is denominated in a foreign
currency, typically US dollars. This stylized fact has been documented by Eichengreen and Hausman (2005), who
call it the "original sin" of developing economies.
7government sets taxes and decides how much to default on debt, subject to its budget constraint;
the government decision, together with the state of the risky loans, determines the bank￿ s ￿nancial
position; the CB sets the in￿ ation rate after having observed both the amount of default and the
state of the bank loans; after having observed the in￿ ation rate set by the CB, investors decide
whether to withdraw their deposits from the bank or not. At the end of period 2, if the bank has
survived, it is liquidated and each individual consumes his/her wealth.
2.1 Preferences and constraints
The private sector. Agent i is initially endowed with wealth wi. In period 1 she allocates
her wealth between cash, government bonds and bank deposits to maximize ￿nal consumption ci.
Let 1￿￿ be the rate of return on cash;6 Rb be the real interest factor on government bonds; ￿ the
default rate. Also, let ￿ denote the tax rate, which is equal for all the agents;7 RBANK the real
return from investing in the ￿nancial market through the bank.
The consumption of agent i will be:
ci = wi
n
￿1i(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2i(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿3iRBANK ￿ ￿
o
; (1)
where ￿1i;￿2i;￿3i ￿ 0 are her portfolio shares of cash, government bonds and bank deposits,
respectively, so that ￿1i + ￿2i + ￿3i = 1. As agents are risk neutral, their portfolio allocation
problem at time 1 is trivial. They simply invest their wealth in the asset which yields the higher
expected return, subject to the constraints on ￿nancial market participation.
The assumption of incomplete ￿nancial market participation can be written as:
Assumption 1
if wi < w
ﬂ
, ￿2i = ￿3i = 0
if wi < ﬂ w , ￿3i = 0:
We introduce this assumption as a simple means of modeling the fact that the rich are relatively
more protected from the consequences of in￿ ation. The cross-sectional distribution of currency
holdings and transaction patterns by income level, as well as the survey evidence on the perceived
costs of in￿ ation strongly suggest that in￿ ation disproportionally harms the poor (we refer to
Albanesi (2007) for a summary of the relevant empirical literature). Limited ￿nancial market
6￿ is an increasing transformation of the in￿ ation rate, and takes values in (-1;1].
7Assuming a progressive or regressive tax system would not change our results, at least qualitatively.
8participation is just one simple way to introduce this asymmetry.8 Parenthetically, limited ￿nancial
diversi￿cation for the poor has also been extensively documented (see Allen and Gale, 1994, 2007,
Guiso et al. 2003).
The government. At the beginning of period 2, the government sets the tax rate and decides
the percentage of defaulted debt (￿ and ￿, respectively) to satisfy the following budget constraint:
￿ = g + (1 ￿ ￿)Rbb + ￿￿Rbb; (2)
where b is the amount of government debt per unit of domestic wealth, ￿ stands for an exogenous
unit cost of repudiation and g is (wasteful) public expenditure.9 Since the world ends with period
2, the government cannot ￿nance its expenditure by issuing new debt.10




￿1i(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2i(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿3iRBANK ￿ ￿
i
widFGOV (i) (3)
where the probability measure FGOV summarizes the importance that the government attaches to
the di⁄erent groups of citizens. The objective function in equation 3 can also be rewritten as
￿1m(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2m(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿3mRBANK ￿ ￿;






for k=1,2,3. The weights ￿1m;￿2m;￿3m can be interpreted as the portfolio shares of cash, govern-
ment bonds and deposits for a particular individual (individual m). The objective function of the
government is such that it maximizes the indirect utility function of m.
The central bank. The CB sets the in￿ ation rate ￿ ￿ 0 in period 2, after having observed
the government￿ s choice about how much to default. Like the government, the CB maximizes a




￿1i(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿2i(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿3iRBANK ￿ ￿
i
widFCB(i)
8For example, the assumption of absolute risk aversion delivers the same qualitative results as our joint assumptions
of risk-neutrality and limited ￿nancial market participation.
9In Calvo (1988) and Beetsma (1996) ￿ is the only cost associated with debt repudiation. In our model some of
the costs are endogenized.
10Our model could be easily turned into an in￿nite horizon model, in which a long-lived government interacts with
non-overlapping generations of agents, and b is the steady state level of debt (Beetsma and Van der Ploeg, 1996).
9or






for k=1,2,3. FCB is the probability measure that summarizes the importance attached by the
CB to the welfare of di⁄erent groups of citizens. As in the case of the government￿ s objective
function, ￿1a;￿2a;￿3a can be interpreted as the portfolio shares for the individual (individual a)
whose indirect utility the CB maximizes. Note also that, as ￿ and ￿ are not within the control of
the CB, its objective is equivalent to the minimization of the following loss function:
LCB(￿;￿;Rr) = ￿￿ ￿ RBANK
where ￿ =
￿1a
￿3a. Intuitively, the bank trades o⁄ the goals of price stability (low ￿) and of banking
sector pro￿tability (high RBANK), with ￿ capturing the relative importance of the former objective
relative to the latter.
2.2 The ￿nancial sector
The representative bank o⁄ers to its depositors/stockholders a fairly standard contract: in-
vestors deposit their funds at the beginning of period 1 and can choose either to wait until the end
of period 2 or to withdraw earlier. The contract gives each investor withdrawing early a nominal
interest rate equal to 1+r. It turns out that the exact value of r is immaterial for our results,
provided that it is not too negative. In particular, it is su¢ cient that the following holds:
Assumption 2 r>￿ ￿ 1
which we take for granted from now on (the intuition behind this assumption will become clear
in section 3.2). The assumption is quite realistic (it is satis￿ed by any deposit rate greater than
0, like the ones that we observe in the real world). Moreover, in the appendix we also consider
an extension to the baseline model where r is endogenously set at the beginning of the game by
the bank in order to maximize expected returns. It turns out that choosing an r which satis￿es
assumption 3 has no cost for a return-maximizing commercial bank.
If the amount required to meet early withdrawals is higher than its assets, the bank fails, and
the assets are shared equally among the depositors.11
11This "equal treatment" provision makes our contract di⁄erent from the one studied in Diamond and Dybvig￿ s
10If it survives until the end of period 2, investors who have waited until then get their pro-rata
share of the remaining assets.
The bank invests a percentage ￿ of the available deposits in government bonds and a percentage
1￿￿ in an illiquid risky asset, with a real long-run return factor ~ Rr and a short-term return factor
equal to 0. ~ Rr is distributed according to a uniform probability distribution with support in [0; ￿ R].
We take the proportion ￿ to be exogenously given. In the appendix we show that our results go
through even if the bank is free to choose ￿, as long as the law or prudential regulations set an
upper limit to the share of risky loans in the bank￿ s portfolio - i.e. a lower bound ￿min > 0 (in
particular, it turns out that a return-maximizing commercial bank will set ￿ = ￿min).





￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb if the bank fails
1 + r ￿ ￿ if the inv. withdraws and the bank doesn￿ t fail
￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + (1 ￿ ￿)Rr if the inv. doesn￿ t withdraw and the bank doesn￿ t fail
where the notation makes explicit that RBANK depends not only on the return on bank loans, but
also on the choices of the policy-makers (￿, ￿).
The institutional features that characterize the representative bank can be summarized as fol-
lows: (i) its liabilities have a shorter maturity than its assets (which implies that it can be subject
to runs); (ii) its assets are relatively more protected from in￿ ation than its liabilities (which implies
that in￿ ation improves the bank￿ s ￿nancial position). Taken together, these features imply that,
in some circumstances, the CB may want to in￿ ate the economy in order to keep the bank alive.
It seems to us that both features capture - admittedly in a very stylized way - important real
world features not only of commercial banks, but also of several other ￿nancial intermediaries.
3 Solving the model
To recap, at the beginning of period 1 the government issues bonds (b). Individuals allocate
their wealth between cash (￿1), government bonds (￿2), and bank deposits (￿3) through which
they gain indirect access to high-return, but risky and illiquid projects. The bank invests a share
￿ of its deposits in government bonds and the rest in the illiquid asset. The return on goverment
bonds (Rb) is set.
(1983) classical essay, which involves a sequential service requirement. There are, however, many models of bank
crises without such a requirement. See for example: Gorton (1985) and Allen and Gale (1998). From a technical
point of view, the advantage of disposing of the Diamond-Dybvig "￿rst-come ￿rst-served" assumption is that we do
not have to consider self-ful￿lling runs and multiple equilibrium issues.
11At the beginning of period 2 the government sets taxes on income and debt, ￿ and ￿, to satisfy
its budget constraint. The return on investment in the risky asset (Rr) is then realized. After
having observed ￿ and the realization of the random variable Rr, but before agents can run to the
bank, the CB sets the in￿ ation rate. Finally, after having observed Rr, as well as the in￿ ation rate
set by the CB, investors decide whether to withdraw money from the bank or not. At the end of
period 2 the bank is liquidated and individuals consume their realized wealth according to equation
(1).
As usual, we ￿nd the subgame perfect equilibrium by solving the model using backward induc-
tion, starting from period 2.
As observed by Calvo (1988), an equilibrium with complete default and in which R goes to
in￿nity always exists, for any range of parameters and for any level of debt. So the interesting
question is whether and under what conditions there are other equilibria.
3.1 The problem in period 2
Private sector choices. For the shareholder/depositor it is (weakly) dominant to withdraw
if and only if:
￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + (1 ￿ ￿)Rr < 1 + r ￿ ￿:
Equivalently, the probability of a bankruptcy once Rr has been observed is:
￿
1 if ￿ < ￿nf ￿ 1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Rr
0 otherwise
(4)
where ￿nf is the minimum level of in￿ ation needed to save the commercial bank.
The bank is closed whenever the realized return Rr on the real investments is too low and/or
the share of reneged debt ￿ is too high. Moreover, the bank is more likely to fail if in￿ ation is
lower, as the opportunity cost of withdrawing the amount promised by the deposit contract is also
lower. This e⁄ect, together with the fact that the assets of the banks are shielded from in￿ ation,
is the reason why the CB is able to implicitly bail out the bank by raising ￿.
The CB￿ s choice. Given the probability of a bankruptcy that we have just derived, the only
two in￿ ation levels which can be optimal for the CB are either 0 or ￿nf. First, note that ￿nf > 0
if and only if:
Rr <




12because for values of Rr above Rr
h the Bank survives even if the CB does not intervene.











because for values of Rr below the threshold Rr
l the CB indeed considers it too costly, in terms of
in￿ ation, to rescue the bank.
The ex-ante probability of a bail out (i.e. the probability before Rr is observed), which is also
the probability of a positive in￿ ation, is a function of ￿ and of Rb:
(
0 if ￿ ￿ ￿l(Rb)
1+r￿￿(1￿￿)Rb
(1+￿)(1￿￿) ￿ R if ￿ > ￿l(Rb)
where
￿l(Rb) ￿ 1 ￿
1 + r
￿Rb
is obtained by imposing Rr
h =0.
Expected in￿ ation, conditional on ￿ and Rb, is then:12
￿ = ￿?(￿;Rb) =
(
0 if ￿ ￿ ￿l(Rb)
[1+r￿￿(1￿￿)Rb]2
2(1+￿)2(1￿￿) ￿ R if ￿ > ￿l(Rb)
(5)
Note that ￿? is an increasing function of ￿. Intuitively, for a given level of Rb, when ￿ rises, the
probability that a positive level of in￿ ation is needed to save the bank from a run increases. The
cost of the CB intervention increases as well, but the ￿rst e⁄ect turns out to dominate the second.
As a result, the probability of a bail out of the banking sector increases.
The expected return from bank investment, evaluated after the government￿ s decision but before
the realization of ~ Rr and the CB￿ s choice, is also a function of ￿ and Rb and is given by:








2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
where
Q(￿;Rb) = 1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb ￿ ￿?(￿;Rb):
The government￿ s choice. Taking Rb as given the government will maximize cm, subject to
its budget constraint (2), the reaction function of the CB (5), and the condition 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.
12We make use of the fact that: ￿
?(￿;R
b) =Probability of CB￿ s intervention￿E(￿jIntervention).
13Substituting in (1) ￿ from the budget constraint and ￿ from the CB￿ s reaction, we get:
cm = ￿1m(1 ￿ ￿(￿;Rb)) + ￿2m(1 ￿ ￿)Rb + ￿3mRBANK(￿;Rb) ￿ [g + (1 ￿ ￿)Rbb + ￿￿Rbb] (6)
which is a concave function of ￿, to be maximized on a compact interval. The government reaction
function can be obtained by di⁄erentiating equation 7. If ￿ < ￿l(Rb),13 it is given by :
￿￿(Rb) =
￿





If instead ￿ > ￿l(Rb) the government reaction function, which we de￿ne as ￿￿￿(Rb), is more
cumbersome to write in an explicit form, but it can be easily shown that ￿￿￿(Rb) is a continuous,
increasing function. It is equal to zero up to a certain value of Rb, and it increases afterwards,
tending to 1 as Rb goes to +1 (see appendix). Its positive part is implicitly given by the following
expression:










The left-hand side of the equation represents the net bene￿ts from default, which are due to the
fact that in the event of default the government needs to levy a lower amount of taxes to satisfy its
budget constraint. On the right-hand side there is the cost of default. It is given by the income loss
su⁄ered by individual m, due to the in￿ ation-induces losses on her money holdings, to the lower
return on her government bonds, and to the reduced pro￿tability of the ￿nancial sector (due in
turn to the capital losses su⁄ered on government bonds and to the increased probability of runs).
3.2 The problem in period 1
As we have derived the response of the government as a function of the cost of public debt, we
are now in a position to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game.
To this end, note that no arbitrage in the market for government bonds implies that:
Rb =
1
1 ￿ ￿exp; (8)
where ￿exp denotes the expected value of ￿ as of the beginning of period 1, and the real interest
rate is equal to the subjective discount rate.
Equilibrium also requires ￿exp=￿, which together with eq. (9) gives:
￿ = 1 ￿
1
Rb:
13It is immediate to check that, whenever ￿ < ￿l(Rb), Q(￿;R




@￿ = 0. If instead





@￿ are all positive.
14Can there be a ￿ = 0 equilibrium? In such an equilibrium the rational-expectation condition entails
that Rb = 1. Together with assumption 2, this entails that we are on the ￿￿￿ reaction function. So
a ￿ = 0 equilibrium exists if and only if the value of Rb after which ￿￿￿ crosses the horizontal line
is greater than 1. A zero default equilibrium then exists only if:
(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ ￿1m
@￿￿
@￿










We can summarize the above ￿ndings as follows:
PROPOSITION 1: A zero-default equilibrium exists if and only if b does not exceed a




￿(1 + r ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
￿1m + ￿2m + ￿
￿
1 +
(1 + r ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
(1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
)(1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿





PROOF: by inspection of equation 10.
The next step is to understand better the role of political and monetary institutions in deter-
mining bmax. To this aim, one can show the following:
PROPOSITION 2: In equilibrium, the ex-ante expected in￿ation rate is strictly positive, so
that the ex ante return on government bonds (which is 1) is higher than the return on money (which
is 1-￿). Therefore, ￿1i = 0 for each i such that wi ￿w
ﬂ
. Moreover, as long as ﬂ R is large enough,
the ex-ante expected return from bank deposits is higher than the return on government bonds. As
a consequence, ￿2i = 0 for each i such that wi ￿ﬂ w.
PROOF: See the appendix.
In words, proposition 2 says that in equilibrium all the ￿nancial market participation constraints
bind. Cash is only held by the poorer part of the population (those with wi <w
ﬂ
). Middle class
people (those with w
ﬂ
￿ wi <ﬂ w) hold only government bonds, and the rich (those with wi ￿ﬂ w) hold
only bank deposits.
154 The determinants of debt intolerance
4.1 The role of government￿ s preferences
Proposition 2 is useful to interpret proposition 1. Indeed, provided ﬂ R is su¢ ciently large,
proposition 1 entails that debt sustainability increases with ￿2m. Suppose for simplicity that
wi = wP for any i such that w(i) < w
ﬂ
, wi = wR for any i such that w(i) ￿ ￿ w, and wi = wM for
any i such that w(i) < ￿ w and w(i) ￿ w
ﬂ














FGOV (fi : wi ￿ ￿ wg);
Ew ￿ wPFGOV (fi : wi < w
ﬂ
g) + wMFGOV (fi : ￿ w > wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g) + wRFGOV (fi : wi ￿ ￿ wg):
Putting things together, one has:
PROPOSITION 3:
(i)bmax is maximized if : FGOV (fi : ￿ w > wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g) = 1;




GOV , such that F
0
GOV (fi : wi ￿ ￿ wg) = F
00
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and F
0




GOV (fi : ￿ w > wi ￿ w
ﬂ










GOV , such that F
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GOV (fi : ￿ w > wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g), provided wM
wR is not too low, bmax is higher
under F
0




Point (i) is quite intuitive: as in a no-default equibrium public debt is mostly held by the middle
class, bmax is maximized when the government just cares about these citizens. Point (ii) and Point
(iii) con￿rm the same intuition. Point (ii) simply says that, all else equal, if the government￿ s
concern for the middle class increases while its concern for the poor decreases, debt tolerance
increases as well. Symmetrically, point (iii) states that, all else equal, if the government￿ s concern
for the middle class increases while its concern for the rich decreases, bmax also increases.14
To sum up, debt sustainability improves if, all else equal, the middle class gets stronger.
14The caveat in point (iii) concerning
wR
wM is due to the fact that a preference shift in favour of the middle class
and against the rich also causes ￿1m to increase, because Ew decreases. As the coe¢ cient attached to ￿1m is lower




164.2 The role of CB￿ s preferences
Until now, we did not make any assumption on FGOV and FCB. In many countries the richer
part of the population enjoys a disproportionate political weight. Bribes and ￿nancial contributions
notoriously buy access to politicians. Moreover, it is a well-established stylized fact that the turn-
out rates of the poor are systematically and signi￿cantly below average in most countries (see for
example Blais, 2000). So it seems interesting to study the implications for debt sustainability of a
government that disregards the interests of the poorer part of the population.
The preferences of the CB are typically less extreme than politicians￿preferences, because most
countries have laws and regulations which at least partially insulate central bankers from political
power, so that the CB can pursue policies which are closer to the welfare-maximizing ones.
The most parsimonious way to capture this institutional context we have in mind is to impose
the following:
Assumption 3
FGOV (fi : wi < w
ﬂ
g) = 0; FCB(i) = ￿L(i) + (1 ￿ ￿)FGOV (i);
where L is the Lebesgue c.d.f. - the utilitarian benchmark assigned by law to the CB as an objective
- and ￿ 2 (0;1]:
In words: the government is not concerned at all about the welfare of poor people (less extreme
objective functions do not deliver qualitatively di⁄erent results, but would complicate the algebra).
The CB, were it free to pursue its preferred policy, would treat all citizens equally. As it is not
fully independent, it maximizes a mix of its own objective function and the one of the government,
with weights given by ￿ and 1-￿ respectively, so that ￿ is a measure of CB￿ s independence (Franzese,
1999, and Berger et al., 2001).
One can prove the following:
PROPOSITION 4: bmax increases with ￿:
PROOF: See appendix.
That is: debt sustainability is higher if the CB is more independent from the political power.
The intuition is quite straightforward: governments favour in￿ ation because it avoids ￿nancial
market crises, which are feared by the rich, while in￿ ation costs are mainly paid by the poor. A
welfare-maximizing CB takes into account that in￿ ation dents the resources of a non-negligible part
17of the population, so it is more in￿ ation-adverse (has higher ￿) than the government. Therefore, an
independent CB acts as a disciplining device for the government, which understands that default
will ultimately back￿re on the very constituency that it wants to protect.
In the appendix, we also consider the polar case of a "populist" government, which disregards
the welfare of the rich: FGOV (fi : wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g) = 0. The result that central bank independence
improves debt sustainability remains valid. In this case, the mechanism at work is di⁄erent: a
"populist" government is more prone to default if it is con￿dent that default will not be translated
into in￿ ation, as in￿ ation harms an important part of its constituency (the poor). Instead, it does
not care about ￿nancial market disruption at all. But an independent, welfare-maximizing CB
takes into account that ￿nancial market disruption is ine¢ cient, and it is prepared to contrast the
￿nancial meltdown, even if this results in a rise in prices. Therefore, it acts as a disciplining device
for "populist" governments as well.
5 Conclusions
We presented a model of monetary-￿scal policy interaction in which the presence of a large
and politically in￿ uent middle class guarantees that public debt will be honoured, because middle
class people invest most of their wealth in government bonds.
We also studied the role of CB independence. Due to limited ￿nancial market participation, the
poor su⁄er relatively more from an unexpected surge in prices, whereas the rich su⁄er relatively
more for a ￿nancial market crisis. As a sovereign default worsens the balance sheet of the ￿nancial
sector, an "elitist" government will pressure the CB to over-react with a burst of in￿ ation, in order
to help ￿nancial intermediaries. Then, an independent CB reduces the government￿ s incentive to
default and rises debt tolerance. Indeed, in the absence of an in￿ ationary response by the CB, a
default would trigger a ￿nancial crisis which would back-￿re on the very people the government
aims to represent. Finally, we show that CB independence increases debt tolerance also in the face
of an excessively pro-poor government.
While our model delivers interesting empirical implications, we leave their con￿rmation for
future research. Some evidence already exists, showing that default is less likely if the government
is responsive to the needs a wider set of citizens and political actors. For example, default seems
less frequent if institutional checks and balances to the power of the executive are in place (van
Rijckegem and Weder, 2004, Kohlscheen, 2007).
18Appendix
The function ￿￿￿(Rb). After some algebra, equation 10 can be written as:
(1 ￿ ￿)b = ￿1m￿
1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb





1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
￿
1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb
2(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
￿￿
1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)Rb
(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
￿￿
;
which is a cubic function of (1 ￿ ￿)Rb. Using the implicit function theorem,
@￿￿￿(Rb)
@Rb = 1￿￿
Rb : It is
an increasing, concave function which goes to -1 as Rb goes to 1 and to 1 as Rb goest to +1:
Proof of proposition 2. In equilibrium, in￿ ation is given by:
￿ = ￿?(0;1) =
[1 + r ￿ ￿]2
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)2 ￿ R
> 0
(from equation 6). Since the real return of money and bonds in a zero default equilibrium are
respectively equal to 1-￿?(0;1) and 1, the ￿rst part of the proposition follows. In equilibrium,
RBANK is equal to:





2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
where
Q(0;1) = 1 + r ￿ ￿ ￿
[1 + r ￿ ￿]2
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿)2 ￿ R
:
The second part of the proposition follows.
Proof of proposition 3. Provided ￿ R is big enough, the coe¢ cient multiplying ￿2m in equation
(11) is greater than the coe¢ cient multiplying ￿3m which is in turn greater than the coe¢ cient









1 + r ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
; C = ￿ + ￿
(1 + r ￿ ￿)
￿ R
(1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿
(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
)(1 ￿
1 + r ￿ ￿
2(1 + ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ R
);
M = FGOV (fi : ￿ w > wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g); P = FGOV (fi : wi < w
ﬂ
g):
19then it is clear that a decrease in P matched by an equal increase in M increases bmax: An
in￿nitesimal increase in M matched by an analogous decrease in R has the following e⁄ect
Ew ￿ wR￿wM
wM [￿(1 ￿ C)wmM + (C ￿ A)wPP]
(Ew)2 :
This expression decreases with P more quickly than it decreases with M, so it attains its minimum
value when P=1:
wP ￿ wR￿wM









1 + C ￿ A
wR;
an increase in M matched by an analogous decrease in R always increases bmax.
In the same vein, an increase in P and a corresponding in￿nitesimal decrease in R increases
bmax i⁄:


















the inequality holds for any value of M.
Proof of proposition 4. A straightforward consequence of assumption 3 is that ￿1m = 0.

























The proposition follows. The weight given to in￿ ation by the CB is greater than that of the












ﬂ g widi ; a term which captures the elitist bias of the government, and to 1￿￿
￿ , a
term which captures the fact that the CB is only partially independent.
20Endogenous r and ￿. RBANK(0;1) is maximized if r is such that Q(0,1)<0. So any r is
optimal as long as 1+r￿￿￿
[1+r￿￿]2
2(1￿￿)(1+￿)2 ￿ R < 0. Given the shape of such function, for any r<￿￿1
which satis￿es this condition, there is another r>￿￿1 which also satis￿es the condition. So choosing
an r which satis￿es assumption 2 has no cost for a return-maximizing commercial bank.
Given the expression for RBANK, it is also obvious that a return-maximizing bank, if it can
choose ￿ under the constraint that ￿ > ￿min with ￿min > 0, will optimally set ￿ = ￿min:
The case of a "populist" government. If this appendix we study the consequences of
substituting the ￿rst part of assumption 3 with
FGOV (fi : wi ￿ w
ﬂ
g) = 0
So that the government is not concerned at all about the welfare of the rich.


























The weight given to in￿ ation by the CB is now lower than that of the government and higher than
that of a utilitarian planner. It remains true than an increase in ￿, by decreasing ￿, increases bmax.
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